The Economic Way of Looking at Life by Becker, Gary S.
THE ECONOMIC WAY OF LOOKING AT LIFE*
Nobel Lecture, December 9, 1992
GARY S. BECKER
Department of Economics, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL. 60637, USA
1. The Economic Approach
My research uses the economic approach to analyze social issues that range
beyond those usually considered by economists. This lecture will describe
the approach, and illustrate it with examples drawn from past and current
work.
Unlike Marxian analysis, the economic approach I refer to does not
assume that individuals are motivated solely by selfishness or gain. It is a
method of analysis, not an assumption about particular motivations. Along
with others, I have tried to pry economists away from narrow assumptions
about self interest. Behavior is driven by a much richer set of values and
preferences.
The analysis assumes that individuals maximize welfare as they conceive it,
whether they be selfish, altruistic,loyal, spiteful, or masochistic. Their
behavior is forward-looking, and it is also consistent over time. In particu-
lar, they try as best they can to anticipate the uncertain consequences of
their actions. Forward-looking behavior, however, may still be rooted in the
past, for the past can exert a long shadow on attitudes and values.
Actions are constrained by income, time, imperfect memory and calculat-
ing capacities, and other limited resources, and also by the available oppor-
tunities in the economy and elsewhere. These opportunities are largely
determined by the private and collective actions of other individuals and
organizations.
Different constraints are decisive for different situations, but the most
fundamental constraint is limited time. Economic and medical progress
have greatly increased length of life, but not the physical flow of time itself,
which always restricts everyone to twenty-four hours per day. So while
goods and services have expended enormously in rich countries, the total
time available to consume has not.
Thus, wants remain unsatisfied in rich countries as well as in poor ones.
* This lecture is dedicated to the memory of George J. Stigler, who died almost exactly one year
ago. Nobel Laureate, outstanding economist, very close friend and mentor, he would be as
happy as I am had he lived to see me deliver the 1992 Nobel Lecture in Economics.For while the growing abundance of goods may reduce the value of addi-
tional goods, time becomes more valuable as goods become more abundant.
Utility maximization is of no relevance in a Utopia where everyone’s needs
are fully satisfied, but the constant flow of time makes such a Utopia
impossible. These are some of the issues analyzed in Becker [1965], and
Linder [1970].
The following sections illustrate the economic approach with four very
different subjects. To understand discrimination against minorities, it is
necessary to widen preferences to accommodate prejudice and hatred of
particular groups. The economic analysis of crime incorporates into ration-
al behavior illegal and other antisocial actions. The human capital approach
considers how the productivity of people in market and non-market situa-
tions is changed by investments in education, skills, and knowledge. The
economic approach to the family interprets marriage, divorce, fertility, and
relations among family members through the lens of utility-maximizing
forward-looking behavior.
2. Discrimination Against Minorities
Discrimination against outsiders has always existed, but with the exception
of a few discussions of the employment of women (see Edgeworth [1922],
and Faucett [1918]), economists wrote little on this subject before the
1950s. I began to worry about racial, religious, and gender discrimination
while a graduate student, and used the concept of discrimination coeffi-
cients to organize my approach to prejudice and hostility to members of
particular groups.
Instead of making the common assumptions that employers only consider
the productivity of employees, that workers ignore the characteristics of
those with whom they work, and that customers only care about the quali-
ties of the goods and services provided, discrimination coefficients incorpo-
rate the influence of race, gender, and other personal characteristics on
tastes and attitudes. Employees may refuse to work under a woman or a
black even when they are well paid to do so, or a customer may prefer not to
deal with a black car salesman. It is only through widening of the usual
assumptions that it is possible to begin to understand the obstacles to
advancement encountered by minorities.
Presumably, the amount of observable discrimination against minorities
in wages and employment depends not only on tastes for discrimination, but
also on other variables, such as the degree of competition and civil rights
legislation. However, aside from the important theory of compensating
differentials originated by Adam Smith, and a few major studies like Myr-
dal’s American Dilemma [1944], there was little else available in the 1950s to
build on to analyze how prejudice and other variables interact. I spent
several years working out a theory of how actual discrimination in earnings
and employment is determined by tastes for discrimination, along with the
degree of competition in labor and product markets, the distribution of
discrimination coefficients among members of the majority group, the40 Economic Sciences 1992
access of minorities to education and training, the outcome of median voter
and other voting mechanisms that determine whether legislation favors or is
hostile to minorities, and other considerations. Since there was so much to
be done in this field, my advisors encouraged me to convert my doctoral
dissertation (Becker [1955]) into a book (Becker [1957]).
The actual discrimination in the market place against a minority group
depends on the combined discrimination of employers, workers, consum-
ers, schools, and governments. The analysis shows that sometimes the
environment greatly softens, while at other times it magnifies, the impact of
a given amount of prejudice. For example, the discrepancy in wages be-
tween equally productive blacks and whites, or women and men, would be
much smaller than the degree of prejudice against blacks and women when
many companies can efficiently specialize in employing mainly blacks or
women.
Indeed, in a world with constant returns to scale in production, two
segregated economies with the same distribution of skills would completely
bypass discrimination and would have equal wages and equal returns to
other resources, regardless of the desire to discriminate against the segre-
gated minorities. Therefore, discrimination by the majority in the market-
place is effective because minority members cannot provide various skills in
sufficient quantities to companies that would specialize in using these
workers.
When the majority is very large compared to the minority - in the United
States whites are nine times as numerous and have much more human and
physical capital per capita than blacks - market discrimination by the
majority hardly lowers their incomes, but may greatly reduce the incomes of
the minority. However, when minority members are a sizable fraction of the
total, discrimination by the majority injures them as well.
This proposition can be illustrated with an analysis of discrimination in
South Africa, where blacks are four to five times as numerous as whites.
Discrimination against blacks has also significantly hurt whites, although
some white groups have benefitted (see Becker [1971, pages 30 - 31], and
Hutt [1964]). Its sizable cost to whites suggests why apartheid and other
blatant forms of Afrikaaner discrimination eventually broke down.
A literature has developed on whether discrimination in the marketplace
due to prejudice disappears in the long run. Whether employers who do not
want to discriminate will eventually compete away all discriminating employ-
ers depends not only on the distribution of tastes for discrimination among
potential employers, but critically also on the nature of firm production
functions.
Of greater significance empirically is the long run discrimination by
employees and customers, who are far more important sources of market
discrimination than employers. There is no reason to expect discrimination
by these groups to be competed away in the long run unless it is possible to
have enough efficient segregated firms and effectively segregated markets
for goods.Gary S. Becker 41
A novel theoretical development in recent years is the analysis of the
consequences of stereotyped reasoning or statistical discrimination (see
Phelps [1972], and Arrow [1973]). This analysis suggests that the beliefs of
employers, teachers, and other influential groups that minority members
are less productive can be self-fulfilling, for these beliefs may cause minor-
ities to underinvest in education, training, and work skills, such as punctual-
ity. The underinvestment does make them less productive (see a good recent
analysis by Loury [1992]).
Evidence from many countries on the earnings, unemployment, and
occupations of blacks, women, religious groups, immigrants, and others has
expanded enormously during the past twenty-five years. This evidence more
fully documents the economic position of minorities and how that changes
in different environments. However, the evidence has not dispelled some of
the controversies over the source of lower incomes of minorities (see Cain’s
[1986] good review of both the theoretical literature and empirical analysis.)
3. Crime and Punishment
I began to think about crime in the 1960s after driving to Columbia
University for an oral examination of a student in economic theory. I was
late and had to decide quickly whether to put the car in a parking lot or risk
getting a ticket for parking illegally on the street. I calculated the likelihood
of getting a ticket, the size of the penalty, and the cost of putting the car in a
lot. I decided it paid to take the risk and park on the street. (I did not get a
ticket.)
As I walked the few blocks to the examination room, it occurred to me
that the city authorities had probably gone through a similar analysis. The
frequency of their inspection of parked vehicles and the size of the penalty
imposed on violators should depend on their estimates of the type of
calculations potential violators like me would make. Of course, the first
question I put to the hapless student was to work out the optimal behavior
of both the offenders and the police, something I had not yet done.
In the 1950s and 1960s intellectual discussions of crime were dominated
by the opinion that criminal behavior was caused by mental illness and social
oppression, and that criminals were helpless “victims.” A book by a well-
known psychiatrist was entitled The Crime of Punishment (see Menninger
[1966]). Such attitudes began to exert a major influence on social policy, as
laws changed to expand criminals’ rights. These changes reduced the appre-
hension and conviction of criminals, and provided less protection to the
law-abiding population.
I was not sympathetic to the assumption that criminals had radically
different motivations from everyone else. I explored instead the theoretical
and empirical implications of the assumption that criminal behavior is
rational (see the early pioneering work by Bentham [1931] and Beccaria
[1986]), but again “rationality” did not necessarily imply narrow material-
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considerations, and did not commit crimes even when they were profitable
and there was no danger of detection.
However, police and jails would be unnecessary if such attitudes always
prevailed. Rationality implied that some individuals become criminals be-
cause of the financial rewards from crime compared to legal work, taking
account of the likelihood of apprehension and conviction, and the severity
of punishment.
The amount of crime is determined not only by the rationality and
preferences of would-be criminals, but also by the economic and social
environment created by public policies, including expenditures on police,
punishments for different crimes, and opportunities for employment,
schooling, and training programs. Clearly, the type of legal jobs available as
well as law, order, and punishment are an integral part of the economic
approach to crime.
Total public spending on lighting crime can be reduced, while keeping
the mathematically expected punishment unchanged, by offsetting a cut in
expenditures on catching criminals with a sufficient increase in the punish-
ment to those convicted. However, risk-preferring individuals are more
deterred from crime by a higher probability of conviction than by severe
punishments. Therefore, optimal behavior by the State would balance the
reduced spending on police and courts from lowering the probability of
conviction against the preference of risk-preferring criminals for a lesser
certainty of punishment. The State should also consider the likelihood of
punishing innocent persons.
In the early stages of my work on crime, I was puzzled by why theft is
socially harmful since it appears merely to redistribute resources, usually
from wealthier to poorer individuals. I resolved the puzzle (Becker [1968,
fn. 3] by recognizing that criminals spend on weapons and on the value of
the time in planning and carrying out their crimes, and that such spending is
socially unproductive - it is what is now called “rent-seeking” - because it
does not create wealth, only forcibly redistributes it. The social cost of theft
was approximated by the number of dollars stolen since rational criminals
would be willing to spend up to that amount on their crimes. (I should have
added the resources spent by potential victims protecting themselves
against crime.)
One reason why the economic approach to crime became so influential is
that the same analytic apparatus can be used to study enforcement of all
laws, including minimum wage legislation, clean air acts, insider trader and
other violations of security laws, and income tax evasions. Since few laws are
self-enforcing, they require expenditures on conviction and punishment to
deter violators. The United States Sentencing Commission has explicitly
used the economic analysis of crime to develop rules to be followed by
judges in punishing violators of Federal statutes (United States Sentencing
Commission [1988]).
Studies of crime that use the economic approach have become common
during the past quarter century. These include analysis of the optimalGary S. Becker 43
marginal punishments to deter increases in the severity of crimes - for
example, to deter a kidnapper from killing his victim (the modern literature
starts with Stigler [1970]), and the relation between private and public
enforcement of laws (see Becker and Stigler [1974], and Landes and Posner
[1975]).
Fines are preferable to imprisonment and other types of punishment
because they are more efficient. With a fine, the punishment to offenders is
also revenue to the State. The early discussions of the relations between
fines and other punishments have been clarified and considerably improved
(see, e.g., Polinsky and Shavell (19841, and Posner [1986]).
Empirical assessments of the effects on crime rates of prison terms,
conviction rates, unemployment levels, income inequality, and other varia-
bles have become more numerous and more accurate (the pioneering work
is by Ehrlich [1973], and the subsequent literature is extensive). The great-
est controversies surround the question of whether capital punishment
deters murders, a controversy that is far from being resolved (see, e.g.,
Ehrlich [1975], and National Research Council [1978]).
4. Human Capital
Until the 1950s economists generally assumed that labor power was given
and not augmentable. The sophisticated analyses of investments in educa-
tion and other training by Adam Smith, Alfred Marshall, and Milton Fried-
man were not integrated into discussions of productivity. Then T. W.
Schultz and others began to pioneer the exploration of the implications of
human capital investments for economic growth and related economic
questions.
Human capital analysis starts with the assumption that individuals decide
on their education, training, medical care, and other additions to knowl-
edge and health by weighing the benefits and costs. Benefits include cultur-
al and other non-monetary gains along with improvement in earnings and
occupations, while costs usually depend mainly on the foregone value of the
time spent on these investments.
Human capital is so uncontroversial nowadays that it may be difficult to
appreciate the hostility in the 1950s and 1960s toward the approach that
went with the term. The very concept of human capital was alleged to be
demeaning because it treated people as machines. To approach schooling as
an investment rather than a cultural experience was considered unfeeling
and extremely narrow. As a result, I hesitated a long time before deciding to
call my book Human Capital, and hedged the risk by using a long subtitle.
Only gradually did economists, let alone others, accept the concept of
human capital as a valuable tool in the analysis of various economic and
social issues.
My work on human capital began with an effort to calculate both private
and social rates of return to men, women, blacks, and other groups from
investments in different levels of education. After a while it became clear
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labor markets and the economy at large. It seemed possible to develop a
more general theory of human capital that includes firms as well as indivi-
duals, and that could consider its macro-economic implications.
The empirical analysis tried to correct data on the higher earnings of
more educated persons for the fact that they are abler: they have higher
I.Q.s and score better on other aptitude tests. It also considered the effects
on rates of return to education of mortality, income taxes, foregone earn-
ings, and economic growth. Ability corrections did not seem very impor-
tant, but large changes in adult mortality and sizeable rates of economic
growth did have big effects.
The empirical study of investments in human capital received a major
boost from Mincer’s classic work [see 1974]. He extended a simple regres-
sion analysis that related earnings to years of schooling (Becker and Chis-
wick [1966]) to include a crude but very useful measure of on-the-job
training and experience - years after finishing school; he used numerous
individual observations rather than grouped data, and he carefully analyzed
the properties of residuals from earnings-generating equations. There are
now numerous estimated rates of return to education and training for many
countries (for a summary of some of this literature, see Psacharopoulos
[1975]).
The accumulating evidence on the economic benefits of schooling and
training also promoted the importance of human capital in policy discus-
sions. This new faith in human capital has reshaped the way governments
approach the problem of stimulating growth and productivity, as was shown
by the emphasis on human capital in the recent presidential election in the
United States.
One of the most influential theoretical concepts in human capital analysis
is the distinction between general and specific training or knowledge (see
Becker [1962], and Oi [1962]). By definition, firm-specific knowledge is
useful only in the firms providing it, whereas general knowledge is useful
also in other firms. Teaching someone to operate an IBM-compatible
personal computer is general training, while learning the authority struc-
ture and the talents of employees in a particular company is specific
knowledge. This distinction helps explain why workers with highly specific
skills are less likely to quit their jobs and are the last to be laid off during
business downturns. It also explains why most promotions are made from
within a firm rather than through hiring - workers need time to learn
about a firm’s structure and “culture” - and why better accounting meth-
ods would include the specific human capital of employees among the
principle assets of most companies.
Firm-specific investments produce rents that must be shared between
employers and employees, a sharing process that is vulnerable to “opportu-
nistic” behavior because each side may try to extract most of the rent after
investments are in place. Rents and opportunism due to specific invest-
ments play a crucial role in the modern economic theory of organizations
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lems (see, for example, Grossman and Hart [1983]). The implications of
specific capital for sharing and turnover have also been used in analyzing
marriage“markets” to explain divorce rates and bargaining within a mar-
riage (see Becker, Landes and Michael [1977], and McElroy and Horney
[1981]), and in analyzing political “markets” to explain the low turnover of
politicians (see Cain, Ferejohn and Firoina [1987]).
The theory of human capital investment relates inequality in earnings to
differences in talents, family background, and bequests and other assets (see
Becker and Tomes [1986]). Many empirical studies of inequality also rely on
human capital concepts, especially differences in schooling and training (see
Mincer [1974]). The sizeable growth in earnings inequality in the United
States during the 1980s that has excited so much political discussion is
largely explained by higher returns to the more educated and better trained
(see, e.g., Murphy and Welch [1992]).
Human capital theory gives a provocative interpretation of the so-called
“gender gap” in earnings. Traditionally, women have been far more likely
than men to work part-time and intermittently partly because they usually
withdrew from the labor force for a while after having children. As a result,
they had fewer incentives to invest in education and training that improved
earnings and job skills.
During the past twenty years all this changed. The decline in family size,
the growth in divorce rates, the rapid expansion of the service sector where
most women are employed, the continuing economic development that
raised the earnings of women along with men, and civil rights legislation
encouraged greater labor force participation by women, and hence greater
investment in market-oriented skills. In practically all rich countries, these
forces significantly improved both the occupations and relative earnings of
women.
The United States’ experience is especially well-documented. The gender
gap in earnings among full-time men and women remained at about 35
percent from the mid-fifties to the mid-seventies. Then women began the
steady economic advance which is still continuing; it narrowed the gap to
under 25 percent. Women are flocking to business, law, and medical
schools, and are working at skilled jobs that they formerly shunned, or were
excluded from.
Schultz and others (see, e.g., Schultz [1963], and Denison [1962]) early on
emphasized that investments in human capital were a major contributor to
economic growth. But after a while the relation of human capital to growth
was neglected, as economists became discouraged about whether the avail-
able growth theory gave many insights into the progress of different coun-
tries. The revival of more formal models of endogenous growth has brought
human capital once again to the forefront of the discussions (see e.g.,
Romer [1986], Lucas [1988], Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1992], and Becker,
Murphy and Tamura [1990]).46 Economic Sciences 1992
5. Formation, Dissolution, and Structure of Families
The rational choice analysis of family behavior builds on maximizing behav-
ior, investments in human capital, the allocation of time, and discrimination
against women and other groups. The rest of the lecture focuses on this
analysis since it is still quite controversial.
Writing A Treatise on the Family is the most difficult sustained intellectual
effort I have undertaken. The family is arguably the most fundamental and
oldest of institutions - some authors trace its origin to more than 50,000
years ago. The Treatise tries to analyze not only modern Western families,
but also those in other cultures and the changes in family structure during
the past several centuries.
Trying to cover this broad subject required a degree of mental commit-
ment over more than six years, during many nighttime as well as daytime
hours, that left me intellectually and emotionally exhausted. In his auto-
biography, Bertrand Russell says that writing the Principia Mathematica used
up so much of his mental powers that he was never again fit for really hard
intellectual work. It took about two years after finishing the Treatise to
regain my intellectual zest.
The analysis of fertility has a long and honorable history in economics,
but until recent years marriage and divorce, and the relations between
husbands, wives, parents, and children had been largely neglected by econo-
mists (although see the important study by Mincer [1962]). The point of
departure of my work on the family is the assumption that when men and
women decide to marry or have children or divorce, they attempt to
maximize their utility by comparing benefits and costs. So they marry when
they expect to be better off than if they remained single, and they divorce if
that is expected to increase their welfare.
People who are not intellectuals are often surprised when told that this
approach is controversial since it seems obvious to them that individuals try
to raise their welfare by marriage and divorce. The rational choice approach
to marriage and other behavior is in fact often consistent with the instinctive
economics “of the common man” (Farrell and Mandel [1992]).
Still, intuitive assumptions about behavior is only the starting point of
systematic analysis, for alone they do not yield many interesting implica-
tions. The rational choice approach embeds them in a framework that
combines maximizing behavior with analysis of marriage and divorce mar-
kets, specialization and the division of labor, old-age support, investments
in children, and legislation that affects families. The implications of the full
model are often not so obvious, and sometimes run sharply counter to
received opinion.
For example, contrary to a common belief about divorce among the rich,
the economic analysis of family decisions shows that wealthier couples are
less likely to divorce than poorer couples. According to this theory, richer
couples tend to gain a lot from remaining married, whereas many poorer
couples do not. A poor woman may well doubt whether it is worth staying
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countries do indicate that the marriages of richer couples are much more
stable (see Becker, Landes and Michael [1977]).
Efficient bargaining between husbands and wives implies that the trend in
Europe and the United States toward no-fault divorce during the past two
decades would not raise divorce rate and, therefore, that contrary to many
claims, it could not be responsible for the rapid rise in these rates. However,
the theory does indicate that no-fault divorce hurts women with children
whose marriages are broken up by their husbands. Households headed by
unmarried women with children now comprise about one-fifth of all house-
holds with children in the United States and other advanced countries.
Economic models of behavior have been used to study fertility ever since
Malthus’s classic essay; the great Swedish economist, Knut Wicksell, was
attracted to economics by his belief in the Malthusian predictions of over-
population. But Malthus’s conclusion that fertility would rise and fall as
incomes increased and decreased was contradicted by the large decline in
birth rates after some countries became industrialized during the latter part
of the nineteenth century and the early part of this century.
The failure of Malthus’s simple model of fertility persuaded economists
that family-size decisions lay beyond economic calculus. The neo-classical
growth model reflects this belief, for in most versions it takes population
growth as exogenous and given (see, for example, Cass [1965], or Arrow
and Kurz [1970]).
However, the trouble with the Malthusian approach is not its use of
economics per se,but an economics inappropriate for modern life. It
neglects that the time spent on child care becomes more expensive as
countries become more productive. The higher value of time raises the cost
of children, and thereby reduces the demand for large families. It also fails
to consider that the greater importance of education and training in indus-
trialized economies encourages parents to invest more in the skills of their
children, which also raises the cost of large families. The growing value of
time and the increased emphasis on schooling and other human capital
explain the decline in fertility as countries develop, and many features of
birth rates in modern economies.
Why in almost all societies have married women specialized in bearing
and rearing children and in certain agricultural activities, whereas married
men have done most of the fighting and market work? The explanation,
presumably, is a combination of biological differences between men and
women - especially differences in their innate capacities to bear and rear
children - and discrimination against women in market activities, partly
through cultural conditioning. Large and highly emotional differences of
opinion exist over the relative importance of biology and discrimination in
generating the traditional division of labor in marriages (see, for example,
Boserup [1970]).
The economic analysis of this division of labor does not determine the
relative importance of biology and discrimination, but it shows how sensi-
tive the division is to small differences in either. Since the return from48 Economic Sciences 1992
investing in a skill is greater when more time is spent utilizing the skill, a
married couple could gain a lot from a sharp division of labor because the
husband could specialize in some types of human capital and the wife in
others. Given such a large gain from specialization within a marriage, only a
little discrimination against women or small biological differences in child-
rearing skills would cause the division of labor between household and
market tasks to be systematically related to gender. The sensitivity to small
differences explains why the empirical evidence cannot readily choose
between biological and “cultural” interpretations. This theory also explains
why many women entered the labor force as families became smaller,
divorce more common, and earning opportunities for women improved.
Relations among family members differ radically from those among em-
ployees of firms and members of other organizations. The interactions
between husbands, wives, parents, and children are more likely to be
motivated by love, obligation, guilt, and a sense of duty than by self-interest
narrowly interpreted.
It was demonstrated about twenty years ago that altruism within families
enormously alters how they respond to shocks and public policies that
redistribute resources among members. Becker [1974] showed that exoge-
nous redistributions of resources from an altruist to her beneficiaries (or
vice versa) may not affect the welfare of anyone because the altruist would
try to reduce her gifts by the amount redistributed. Barro [1974] derived
this result in an intergenerational context, which cast doubt on the common
assumption that government deficits and related fiscal policies have real
effects on the economy.
The “Rotten-Rid Theorem” - the name is very popular even when critics
disagree with the result - carries the analysis of altruism further, for it
shows how the behavior of selfish individuals is affected by altruism. Under
some conditions, even selfish beneficiaries - of course, most parents
believe that the best example of this is selfish children with altruistic parents
- are induced to act as if they are altruistic toward their benefactors
because that raises their own selfish welfare. They act this way because
otherwise gifts from their benefactors would be reduced enough to make
them worse off (see Becker [1974], and the elaboration and qualifications to
the analysis in Lindbeck and Weibull [1987], Bergstrom [1989], and Becker
[1991, pp. 9-13]).
The Bible, Plato’s Republic, and other early writings discussed the treat-
ment of young children by their parents, and of elderly parents by adult
children. Both the elderly and children need care - in one case because of
declining health and energy, and in the other because of biological growth
and dependency. A powerful implication of the economic analysis of rela-
tions within families is that these two issues are closely related.
Parents who leave sizable bequests do not need old-age support because
instead they help out their children. I mentioned earlier one well-known
implication of this: under certain conditions, budget deficits and social
security payments to the elderly have no real effects because parents simplyGary S. Becker 49
offset the bigger taxes in the future on their children through larger
bequests.
It is much less appreciated that altruistic parents who leave bequests also
tend to invest more in their children’s skills, habits, and values. For they
gain from financing all investments in the education and skills of children
that yield a higher rate of return than the return on savings. They can
indirectly save for old age by investing in children, and then reducing
bequests when elderly. Both parents and children would be better off when
parents make all investments in children that yield a higher return than that
on savings, and then adjust bequests to the efficient level of investment (see
section 1 of the Appendix for a formal demonstration).
Even in rich countries many parents do not plan on leaving bequests.
These parents want old-age support, and they “underinvest” in their chil-
dren’s education and other care. They underinvest because they cannot
compensate themselves for greater spending on children by reducing be-
quests since they do not plan on leaving any.
Both the children and parents would be better off if the parents agreed to
invest more in the children in return for a commitment by the children to
care for them when they need help. But how can such a commitment be
enforced? Economists and lawyers usually recommend a written contract to
insure commitment, but it is absurd to contemplate that a society will
enforce contracts between adults and ten-year-olds or teenagers.
Part of my current research considers an indirect way to generate com-
mitments when promises and written agreements are not binding. I will
describe briefly some of this new work because it carries the economic
approach to the family unto uncharted ground related to the rational
formation of preferences within families.
Parental attitudes and behavior have an enormous influence on their
children. Parents who are alcoholic or are addicted to crack create a bizarre
atmosphere for impressionable youngsters, whereas parents with stable
values who transmit knowledge and inspire their children favorably influ-
ence both what their children are capable of and what they want to do. The
economic approach can contribute insights into the formation of prefer-
ences through childhood experiences without necessarily adopting the
Freudian emphasis on the primacy of what happened during the first few
months of life.
Again, I am trying to model a common sense idea; namely, that the
attitudes and values of adults are enormously influenced by their childhood
experiences. An Indian doctor living in the United States may love curry
because he acquired a strong taste for it while growing up in India, or a
woman may forever fear men because she was sexually abused as a child.
Through its assumption of forward-looking behavior, the economic point
of view implies that parents try to anticipate the effect of what happens to
children on their attitudes and behavior when adults. These effects help
determine the kind of care parents provide. For example, parents worried
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obligation, duty, and filial love that indirectly, but still very effectively, can
“commit” children to helping them out.
Economists have too narrow a perspective on commitments. “Manipulat-
ing” the experiences of others to influence their preferences may appear to
be inefficient and fraught with uncertainty, but it can be the most effective
way to obtain commitment. Economic theory needs to incorporate guilt,
affection, and related attitudes into preferences in order to have a deeper
understanding of when commitments are “credible” (see section 2 of the
appendix for a formal discussion).
Parents who do not leave bequests may be willing to make their children
feel guiltier precisely because they gain more utility from greater old-age
consumption than they lose from an equal reduction in children’s consump-
tion. This type of behavior may be considerably more common than suggest-
ed by the number of families that leave bequests, for parents with young
children often do not know whether they will be financially secure when
they are old. They may try to protect themselves against ill health, unem-
ployment, and other hazards of old age by instilling in their children a
willingness to help out if that becomes necessary.
This analysis of the link between childhood experiences and adult prefer-
ences is closely related to work on rational habit formation and addictions
(see Becker and Murphy [1988]). The formation of preferences is rational in
the sense that parental spending on children partly depends on the antici-
pated effects of childhood experiences on adult attitudes and behavior. I do
not have time to consider the behavior of children - such as crying and
acting “cute” - that tries in turn to influence the attitudes of parents.
Many economists, including myself, have excessively relied on altruism to
tie together the interests of family members. Recognition of the connection
between childhood experiences and future behavior reduces the need to
rely on altruism in families. But it does not return the analysis to a narrow
focus on self-interest, for it partially replaces altruism by feelings of guilt,
obligation, anger, and other attitudes usually neglected by models of ration-
al behavior.
If parents anticipate that children will help out in old age - perhaps
because of guilt or related motivations - even parents who are not very
loving toward their children would invest more in the children’s human
capital, and save less to provide for their old age. (For a proof, see section 3
of the Appendix.)
Equation (12) of the Appendix shows that parents always prefer small
increases in their own consumption to equal increases in their children’s if
the only way they can get greater consumption is by making children feel
guiltier. This means that altruistic parents who take steps to make their
children feel guiltier always underinvest in the children’s human capital.
This shows directly why creating guilt has costs and is not fully efficient.
Altruistic family heads who do not plan to leave bequests try to create a
“warm” atmosphere in their families, so that members are willing to come
to the assistance of those experiencing financial and other difficulties. ThisGary S. Becker 51
conclusion is relevant to discussions of so-called “family values,” a subject
that received attention during the recent presidential campaign in the
United States. Parents help determine the values of children - including
their feelings of obligation, duty, and love - but what parents try to do can
be greatly affected by public policies and changes in economic and social
conditions.
Consider, for example, a program that transfers resources to the elderly,
perhaps especially to poorer families who do not leave bequests, that
reduces the elderly’s dependence on children. According to the earlier
analysis, parents who do not need support when they become old do not try
as hard to make children more loyal, guiltier, or otherwise feel as well-
disposed toward their parents. This means that programs like social security
that significantly help the elderly would encourage family members to drift
apart emotionally, not by accident but as maximizing responses to those
policies.
Other changes in the modern world which have altered family values
include increased geographical mobility, the greater wealth that comes with
economic growth, better capital and insurance markets, higher divorce
rates, smaller families, and publicly-funded health care. These develop-
ments have generally made people better off, but they also weakened the
personal relations within families between husbands and wives, parents and
children, and among more distant relatives, partly by reducing the incen-
tives to invest in creating closer relations.
6. Concluding Comments
An important step in extending the traditional analysis of individual rational
choice is to incorporate into the theory a much richer class of attitudes,
preferences, and calculations. This step is prominent in all the examples
that I consider. The analysis of discrimination includes in preferences a
dislike of - prejudice against - members of particular groups, such as
blacks or women. In deciding whether to engage in illegal activities, poten-
tial criminals are assumed to act as if they consider both the gains and the
risks - including the likelihood they will be caught and severity of punish-
ments. In human capital theory, people rationally evaluate the benefits and
costs of activities, such as education, training, expenditures on health,
migration, and formation of habits that radically alter the way they are. The
economic approach to the family assumes that even intimate decisions like
marriage, divorce, and family size are reached through weighing the advan-
tages and disadvantages of alternative actions. The weights are determined
by preferences that critically depend on the altruism and feelings of duty
and obligation toward family members.
Since the economic, or rational choice, approach to behavior builds on a
theory of individual decisions, criticisms of this theory usually concentrate
on particular assumptions about how these decisions are made. Among
other things, critics deny that individuals act consistently over time, and
question whether behavior is forward-looking, particularly in situations that52 Economic Sciences 1992
differ significantly from those usually considered by economists - such as
those involving criminal, addictive, family, or political behavior. This is not
the place to go into a detailed response to the criticisms, so I simply assert
that no approach of comparable generality has yet been developed that
offers serious competition to rational choice theory.
While the economic approach to behavior builds on a theory of individual
choice, it is not mainly concerned with individuals. It uses theory at the
micro level as a powerful tool to derive implications at the group or macro
level. Rational individual choice is combined with assumptions about tech-
nologies and other determinants of opportunities, equilibrium in market
and nonmarket situations, and laws, norms, and traditions to obtain results
concerning the behavior of groups. It is mainly because the theory derives
implications at the macro level that it is of interest to policymakers and
those studying differences among countries and cultures.
None of the theories considered in this lecture aims for the greatest
generality; instead, each tries to derive concrete implications about behav-
ior that can be tested with survey and other data. Disputes over whether
punishments deter crime, whether the lower earnings of women compared
to men are mainly due to discrimination or lesser human capital, or whether
no-fault divorce laws increase divorce rates all raise questions about the
empirical relevance of predictions derived from a theory based on individ-
ual rationality.
A close relation between theory and empirical testing helps prevent both
the theoretical analysis and the empirical research from becoming sterile.
Empirically oriented theories encourage the development of new sources
and types of data, the way human capital theory stimulated the use of survey
data, especially panels. At the same time, puzzling empirical results force
changes in theory, as models of altruism and family preferences have been
enriched to cope with the finding that parents in Western countries tend to
bequeath equal amounts to different children.
I have been impressed by how many economists want to work on social
issues rather than issues forming the traditional core of economics. At the
same time, specialists from fields that do consider social questions are often
attracted to the economic way of modelling behavior because of the analyt-
ical power provided by the assumption of individual rationality. Thriving
schools of rational choice theorists and empirical researchers are active in
sociology, law, political science, history, anthropology, and psychology. The
rational choice model provides the most promising basis presently available
for a unified approach to the analysis of the social world by scholars from
the social sciences.
APPENDIX
1. To show this formally, suppose that each person lives for three periods:
youth (y), middle age (m), and old age (o), and has one child at the beginning
of period m. A child’s youth overlaps his parents’ middle age, and a child’sGary S. Becker 53
middle age overlaps his parents’ old age. The utility parents get from
altruism is assumed to be separable from the utilities produced by their own
consumption.
A simple utility function of parents (V,) incorporating these assumptions
is
Each person works and earns income only during middle age. It is
possible to save then to provide consumption for old age (Zop ) by accumulat-
ing assets with a yield of Rk . Parents influence children’s earnings by
investing in their human capital. The marginal yield on investments in
human capital (Rh ) is defined as
(2)
where Ec is the earnings of children at middle age. This yield is assumed to
decline as more is invested in children: dRt,/dh I 0, where h is the amount
invested.
Parents must also decide whether to leave bequests, denoted by k,. If
parents can consume at different ages, leave bequests, or invest in the
child’s human capital, their budget constraint is
where A is the present value of resources.
One first order condition to maximize parental utility determines their
optimal consumption at middle and old age
and the last determines investments in the human capital of children
Equation (6) assumes that the first order condition for investment in
human capital is a strict equality; that some human capital is always invested
in children. This can be justified with an Inada-type condition that small
investments in human capital yield very high rates of return. In rich econo-
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nutrition of children presumably do yield a very good return. As long as
parents are not completely selfish - as long as a > 0 - then such a
condition does always imply positive investment in human capital. For
completely selfish parents, equation (6) would be an inequality.
Equation (4) determines the accumulation of assets to finance old-age
consumption. Whether parents leave bequests or want old-age support
from their children is determined by the inequality in (5). If this is a strict
inequality, parents want support and would not leave bequests.
That inequality can be written in a more revealing way. If children also
maximize their utility, then the envelope theorem implies that
(7)
Equation (7) has the intuitive interpretation that parents do not give be-
quests when the utility they get from their children consuming a dollar more
at middle age is less than the utility they get from a dollar more of their own
consumption at old age. Obviously, such an inequality holds for completely
selfish parents since the left-hand side of equations (5) and (7) are zero when
a is zero. The weaker the altruism (the smaller a) the more parents want
from children.
Combining equations (5) and (6) gives
(8)
Equation (8) implies that the marginal rate of return on human capital
equals the return on assets when parents give bequests, and it is greater
than the asset return when parents do not give bequests. Parents can help
children either by investing in their human capital or by leaving them assets.
Since they want to maximize the advantage to children, given the cost to
themselves - parents are not sadistic - they help in the most efficient
form.
Consequently, if strict inequality holds in equation (8), they would not
give bequests, for the best way to help children when the marginal return on
human capital exceeds that on assets is to invest only in human capital.
Parents leave bequests only when they get the same marginal return on both
(some of these results have been derived in Becker and Tomes [1986]).
2. To analyze in a simple way the influence of parents over the formation of
children’s preferences, suppose parents can take actions x and y when
children are young that affect children’s preferences when adults. I use the
assumption of separability to write the utility function of middle-aged
children as
I assume that H’ > 0 and Gx > 0, which means that an increase in y raises
the utility of children, but an increase in x lowers their utility. For concrete-
ness, interpret H as “happiness,” and G as the “guilt” children feel towardGary S. Becker 55
their parents, so that greater x makes children feel guiltier. The question is:
why would non-sadistic parents want to make their children feel guilty?
The variable g is the key to understanding why. This measures the
contribution of children to the old-age support of parents; let us assume
that children feel less guilty when they contribute more (Gs < 0). If
G, > 0, then greater x both raises children’s guilt and stimulates more
giving by them.
The budget constraint of parents becomes:
The first-order condition for the optimal y is
The first order condition for x is more interesting, for even altruistic
parents may want to make their children feel guilty if that sufficiently raises
old-age support. This first order condition can be written as
where dG/dx incorporates the induced change in g. The second term in the
middle expression is negative to altruistic parents because greater x does
raise children’s guilt, which lowers the utility of these parents (a > 0).
However, guilt also induces children to increase old-age support, as given
by dg/dx. The magnitude of this response determines whether it is worth-
while for parents to make children feel guiltier.
Increased old-age support from children has two partially offsetting
effects on the welfare of altruistic parents. On the one hand, it raises their
old-age consumption and utility, as given by u&,. On the other hand, it
lowers children’s consumption, and hence the utility of altruistic parents, as
given by -auk,. This means that altruistic parents who leave bequests never
try to make children feel guiltier, for u&, = auk, for these parents. Since
dG/dx > 0, they must be worse 05 when their children feel guiltier.
3. Combine the first order conditions in Equations (5) and (6) to get
(13)
Both sides of this equation exceed unity when parents do not give bequests.
Since greater old-age support from children lowers the left-hand side by
lowering the numerator and raising the denominator, the right-hand side
must also fall to be in a utility maximizing equilibrium. But since Rk is given
by market conditions, the right-hand side can fall only if Rh, falls, which56 Economic Sciences 1992
implies greater investment in children when parents expect greater old-age
support from children. Even completely selfish parents (a=0) might invest in
children if that would sufficiently increase the expected old-age support
from guilty children.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Arrow, Kenneth J., (1973) “The Theory of Discrimination,” in Orley Ashenfelter
and Albert Rees, eds., Discrimination in Labor Markets (Princeton NJ: Princeton
University Press), pp. 3-33.
Arrow, Kenneth J. and Kurt, Mordecai, (1970) Public Investment, the Rate of Return,
and Optimal Fiscal Policy (Baltimore: Published for Resources for the Future by
Johns Hopkins University Press).
Barro, Robert J., (1974) “Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?” Journal of Political
Economy 82: 1095 - 1117.
Barro, Robert J. and Sala-i-Martin, X., (1992) “Convergence,” Journal of Political
Economy 100: 223-51.
Beccaria, Cesarc, marchese di, (1986) On Crimes and Punishment, 1st ed., translation
of Dei Delith e delle Pene (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.).
Becker, Gary S., (1955) “Discrimination in the Market Place,” Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Chicago.
Becker, Gary S., (1957) The Economics of Discrimination, 1st ed. (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press).
Becker, Gary S., (1962) “Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis,”
Journal of Political Economy LXX: 9 - 49.
Becker, Gary S., (1964) Human Capital, 1st ed. (New York: Columbia University
Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research).
Becker, Gary S., (1965) “A Theory of the Allocation of Time,” Economic ]ournal 75
(299):493-517.
Becker, Gary S., (1968) “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,“ Journal
of Political Economy 76: 169 - 2 17.
Becker, Gary S., (1971) The Economics of Discrimination, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press).
Becker, Gary S., (1974) “A Theory of Social Interactions,” Journal of Political
Economy 82: 1063 -93.
Becker, Gary S., (1991) A Treatise on the Family, expanded ed. (Cambridge MA:
Harvard University Press).
Becker, Gary S. and Chiswick, Barry, (1966) “Education and the Distribution of
Earnings,” American Economic Review LVI: 358 - 69.
Becker, Gary S., Landes, Elisabeth M., and Michael, Robert T., (1977) “An Econom-
ic Analysis of Marital Instability," ]ournal of Political Economy 85: 1141 -87.
Becker, Gary S. and Murphy, Kevin M., (1988) “The Family and the State,” Journal of
Law and Economics 3 1: 1 - 18.
Becker, Gary S., Murphy, Kevin M., and Tamura, Robert, (1990) “Human Capital,
Fertility, and Economic Growth,” Journal of Political Economy 98: S12 - 37.
Becker, Gary S. and Stigler, George J., (1974) “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and
Compensation of Enforcers,” Journal of Legal Studies 3: 1 - 18.
Becker, Gary S. and Tomes, Nigel, (1986) “Human Capital and the Rise and Fall of
Families,” Journal of Labor Economics 4: S 1 -S39.
Bentham, Jeremy, (1931) Theory of Legislation (New York: Harcourt, Brace).
Bergstrom, Theodore, (1989) “A Fresh Look at the Rotten-Kid Theorem - And
Other Household Mysteries," Journal of Political Economy 97: 1 138 - 59.
Boserup, Ester, (1970) Women’s Role in Economic Development (London: Allen and
Unwin).Gary S. Becker 57
Cain, Bruce E., Ferqjohn, John, and Fiorina,Morris, (1987) The Personal Vote:
Constituency Service and Electoral Independence (Cambridge MA: Harvard University
Press).
Cain, Glen G., (1986) “The Economic Analysis of Labor Market Discrimination: A
Survey,”in O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics,
Handbooks in Labor Economics Series, no. 5 (New York: Elsevier Science): 693-
785.
Cass, David, (1965) “Optimal Growth in an Aggregative Model of Capital Accumula-
tion,” Review of Economic Studies 32:233-240.
Denison, Edward F., (1962) Sources of Economic Growth in the United States (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Committee for Economic Development).
Edgeworth, F. Y., (1922) “Equal Pay to Men and Women for Equal Work” Economic
Journal XXXII: 431-57.
Ehrlich, Isaac, (1973) “Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and
Empirical Investigation,”Journal of Political Economy 81: 521-65.
Ehrlich, Isaac, (1975) “The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of
Life and Death,” American Economic Review 85: 397-417.
Farrell, C. and Mandel, M., “Uncommon Sense,”Business Week, October 26, 1992,
pp. 36-37.
Faucett, M., (1918) “Equal Pay for Equal Work,”Economic Journal XXVIII: l-6.
Grossman, Sanford J. and Hart, Oliver D., (1983) “An Analysis of the Principal-
Agent Problem,” Econometrica 51: 7 - 45.
Hutt, William H., (1964) The Economics of the Colour Bar: A Study of the Economic
Origins and Consequences of Racial Segregation in South Africa (London: Published
for the Institute of Economic Affairs by A. Deutsch).
Landes, William M. and Posner, Richard A., (1975) “The Private Enforcement of
Law," Journal of Legal Studies 4:1-46.
Lindbeck, Assar and Weibull, Jorgen W., (1988) “Strategic Interaction with
Altruism: The Economics of Fait Accompli,” Journal of Political Economy 96:
1165-82. University of Stockholm.
Linder, Staffan Burenstam, (1970) The Hurried Leisure Class (New York: Columbia
University Press).
Loury, Glenn C., (I992) “Incentive Effects of Affirmative Action,” Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 523: 19 - 29.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr., (1988)“On the Mechanics of Economic Development,”
Journal of Monetary Economics 22: 3-42.
McElroy, Marjorie B. and Horney, Mary Jean, (198 1) “Nash-Bargained Household
Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand,” International
Economic Review 22: 333-49.
Menninger, Karl, (1966) The Crime of Punishment (New York: The Viking Press).
Mincer, Jacob, (1962) "Labor Force Participation of Married Women,” in Aspects of
Labor Economics, a conference of the Universities- National Bureau Committee for
Economic Research (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press for the National
Bureau of Economic Research).
Mincer, Jacob, (I974) Schooling, Experience,and Earnings (New York: Columbia
University Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research).
Murphy, Kevin M. and Welch, Finis, (I992) “The Structure of Wages,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 107: 285 - 326.
Myrdal, Gunnar, (1944) An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democ-
racy, 2 vo1s. (New York: Randon House).
National Research Council (U.S.), Panel of Research on Deterrent and Incapacita-
tive Effects, (1978) Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of Criminal
Sanctions on Crime Rates, Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen, and Daniel Nagin,
eds. (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences).58 Economic Sciences 1992
Oi, Walter Y., (1962) “Labor as a Quasi-Fixed Factor,” Journal of Political Economy
70: 538-55.
Phelps, Edmund S., (1972) “The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism,” American
Economic Review 62: 659 - 61.
Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Shavell, Steven, (1984) “The Optimal Use of Fines and
Imprisonment,” Journal of Public Economics 24: 89 -99.
Posner, Richard A., (1986) Economic Analysis of Law, 3rd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown).
Psacharopoulos, George, (1975) Earnings and Education in OECD Countries (Paris:
Organization for Economic Co-operation; Washington, D.C.: OECD Publications
Center).
Romer, Paul M., (1986) “Increasing Returns and Long Run Growth,” Journal of
Political Economy 94: 1002-37.
Schultz, Theodore W., (1963) The Economic Value of Education (New York: Columbia
University Press).
Stigler, George J., (1970) “The Optimum Enforcement of Laws,” Journal of Political
Economy 78: 526 - 36.
United States Sentencing Commission (1988) “Discussion Draft of Sentencing
Guidelines and Policy Statement for Organizations: Proposed Chapter 8 for the
Guidelines Manual.”
Williamson, Oliver E., (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets,
Relational Contracting (New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
1 have had valuable comments from James Coleman, Richard Posner, Sherwin
Rosen, Raaj Sah, Jose Scheinkman, Richard Stern, and Stephen Stigler.